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THE TRANSFORMATION OF IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM
Jennifer M. Chacón*

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Before you get into what the case is
about, I’d like to clear up at the outset what it’s not about. No part
of your argument has to do with racial or ethnic profiling, does it?
I saw none of that in your brief.
GENERAL VERRILLI: Where—that’s correct, Mr. Chief Justice.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Okay. So this is not a case about
ethnic profiling.
GENERAL VERRILLI: We’re not making any allegation about
racial or ethnic profiling in the case.1
Thus began the Solicitor General’s argument in the landmark case of Arizona v.
United States.2 This might strike the casual observer as odd. After all, concerns about
discriminatory policing and unlawful harassment, detentions and arrest were the core
of the criticisms lodged against Arizona’s controversial Support Our Law Enforcement
and Safe Neighborhoods Act3 (generally referred to as “S.B. 1070”) from the moment
Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law on April 23, 2010.4 The President of the
United States criticized the law as “undermin[ing] basic notions of fairness that we
cherish as Americans, as well as the trust between police and our communities that
is so crucial to keeping us safe.”5 The Mexican American Legal Defense Fund decried
* Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine School of Law. A.B. Stanford University, 1994. J.D. Yale
Law School, 1998. I would like to thank my research assistants Edgar Aguilasocho and Alisa
Hartz for helping me to gather materials that were essential to this article, and Dianna Sahhar
of the Law Library, who is tireless in her support of my research efforts. I would also like to
thank Mary Louise Frampton for her help in arranging for me to present this work at the U.C.
Berkeley School of Law, where I received thoughtful comments and questions from Mary
Louise, Maria Echaveste, Bertrall Ross, Leti Volpp, Charles D. Weisselberg and others. I
would also like to thank Dean Erwin Chemerinsky for his tremendous support of my research.
Finally, I thank my family for nurturing me and giving me the time that I need to write.
1
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(No. 11-182), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts
/11-182.pdf.
2
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
3
Ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41).
4
Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2010, at A1.
5
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the law as “a recipe for racial and ethnic profiling.”6 Cardinal Mahoney of Los Angeles
declared that the provisions requiring state and local officials to verify immigration
documents were akin to Naziism.7 Liberal commentator Rachel Maddow quickly
dubbed S.B. 1070 the “papers, please” law and criticized it on similar grounds.8 In
their initial challenge to the Arizona law, many immigrants’ rights and civil rights
advocacy groups raised challenges to the law based on the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection.9 Indeed, these challenges have been renewed in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States.10
6

Id. at A9.
Id. Margaret Hu has noted that the cultural discomfort that denizens of the United States
have with these types of documentation requirements is captured neatly in the classic film
Casablanca. Margaret Hu, ‘Show Me Your Papers’ Laws and American Cultural Values,
JURIST—FORUM (Nov. 15, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/margaret-hu-immigration
-papers.php. The first scene features a Nazi official asking a man to show his papers and ruthlessly shooting the man in the back when he produces expired documents. Hu writes:
By the time we get to the end of the film, awash in a sea of fedoras and
trench coats, the fog resplendent as a stylish film noir accessory, it is
easy to forget that the plot revolves around immigrants and “papers.”
Putting the love triangle aside, the plot unfolds within the context of a
political meta-narrative: the desperate plight of political refugees from
a war-torn Europe who lack the good fortune, wealth or connections to
possess their “papers.” The film portrays the exiled and persecuted of
all nationalities trapped in Vichy-occupied Morocco, devising escape
schemes to the US, which symbolizes a dream of freedom. Casablanca,
ultimately, is about immigrants seeking hope and redemption from discretionary abuses of power and the arbitrariness of having one’s life
and fortunes tied to the necessity of having the right “papers.”
Id.
8
The Rachel Maddow Show (MSNBC television broadcast Apr. 14, 2010), transcript
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36552869/ns/msnbc_tv-rachel_maddow_show/t
/rachel-maddow-show/#.UBgiDjFSRis.
9
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Mexican American Legal Defense
Fund (MALDEF), the National Immigration Law Center (NILC), the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the ACLU Foundation of Arizona, the
National Day Labor Organizing Network (NDLON), and the Asian Pacific American Legal
Center (APALC) challenged the law on First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds
shortly after its enactment. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, 56–58,
Friendly House v. Whiting (D. Ariz. 2011) (No. CV-10-1061-PHX-SRB), 2011 WL 5367286
[hereinafter Whiting Complaint].
10
See Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012); see
also Plaintiffs’ Proposed Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support, Valle del Sol v. Whiting (D. Ariz. July 17, 2012) (No. 2:10-cv-01061SRB) [hereinafter Valle del Sol Motion], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/pi_brief
_2b__5.pdf (reasserting their request for an injunction of S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) on Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds as well as preemption grounds, and moving for an injunction
of the state anti-harboring statute of Section 5 on preemption grounds).
7
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The Solicitor General quickly clarified that those arguments were not before the
Court in April of 2012. He framed his claim as a simple one: the state of Arizona had
exceeded its authority in enacting S.B. 1070, and four sections of the legislation were
preempted by federal immigration law.11 Arguably, however, the Solicitor General
immediately ceded too much ground in the first few seconds of his argument. On the
one hand, the facial preemption challenge mounted by the federal government did
not and could not rest on individualized showings of racial and ethnic profiling. On
the other hand, it is because the Arizona law was inconsistent with, among other
things, the antidiscrimination principles embedded in the structure of federal immigration law that it was preempted. The structural certainty of racial and ethnic profiling in the enforcement of S.B. 1070 is an important reason why the law was preempted,
not a separate set of concerns that needed to wait for an as-applied challenge.
The courts and the litigants were aware of individual rights issues that lurked
behind the dispute over federal power. Preemption became a means through which
the feared individual rights consequences of S.B. 1070 might be averted without the
need to litigate the effects of the law on particular individuals.12 The preemption argument was therefore critically important for noncitizens present without authorization.13
As Professor Hiroshi Motomura has illustrated, preemption claims are one of several
kinds of claims raised in litigation as a means by which unauthorized migrants “assert
rights obliquely and incompletely.”14 Identifying, detaining, and in some cases prosecuting unauthorized migrants are the express goals of S.B. 1070.15 Those goals are not
constitutionally prohibited provided they are achieved through constitutional means.
After all, the federal government does all of these things every day.16 Unauthorized
migrants therefore could not challenge the law on the grounds of its intended results;
they could only challenge the means by which those results would be achieved under
the law. Their ability to mount a legal challenge depended on the claim that the state
of Arizona was not the appropriate actor.17
11

The United States had initially contended that S.B. 1070 was preempted in its entirety,
but Arizona District Court Judge Bolton rejected this argument, finding that only Sections 2(B),
3, 5(C) and 6 were preempted. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986, 1008 (D.
Ariz. 2010).
12
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1736–38 (2010).
13
Id. at 1730.
14
Id. Motomura argues that preemption arguments are one of five general patterns of
“transsubstantive arguments” that effectively serve to enable migrants to claim legal protections notwithstanding constitutional and statutory limitations on their substantive rights. Id.
at 1723, 1728–29.
15
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010) (expressing the legislative intent
of S.B. 1070).
16
Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/
(last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
17
See Motomura, supra note 12, at 1736–46, for a discussion and critique of previous,
similar deployments of preemption claims.
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But the preemption claim was also very important for vindicating the rights of
citizens and noncitizens lawfully present who feared that they would suffer the discriminatory effects of the Arizona law. For citizens and authorized migrants18 who
feared that they would be profiled and subjected to prolonged stops as a consequence of the law, the preemption challenge allowed them a means of challenging
the law as a facial matter without waiting for the likely unconstitutional effects in
implementation.19
Perhaps this explains why the reaction to the Court’s decision in Arizona v. United
States has been so mixed.20 The ruling was actually a pretty clear victory for the federal government—at least as far as the preemption principles that were at stake.21 As
David Martin summarized the matter:
[T]he majority warmly reaffirmed a constitutional doctrine, known
as obstacle preemption, that will favor the federal government’s
interests in a wide swath of future cases. It also strongly endorsed
the primacy of the federal government in immigration control, in
the face of a stunningly vitriolic dissent from Justice Scalia asserting the sovereign exclusion powers of the states. And it rejected
a “mirror-image” theory propounded by SB 1070’s proponents
that promised much future state legislative mischief.22
And yet, in upholding Section 2(B), the Court left in place a provision that was
a source of deep concern for opponents of the law, and effectively green-lighted
systematic state and local participation in immigration enforcement in a way that
failed to account for the inevitable discriminatory effects of such participation.23 It
18

I am using the term “migrants” here to account for “immigrants” and “nonimmigrants”
as they are defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006)
19
See Motomura, supra note 12, at 1738 (explaining “[a] preemption-based institutional
competence argument . . . is typically the challengers’ only hope of prevailing and the statute’s
only risk of invalidation”).
20
David A. Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41, 41–42 (2012), http://
www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2012/04/14/Martin_Web.pdf.
21
Id.
22
Id.; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Arizona’s S.B. 1070: Who Won, Why, and What Now?,
LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, 2012 EMERGING ISSUES 6515 (July 2012) (describing
the ruling as a formal legal victory for the federal government, albeit one that will not mitigate most of the law’s deleterious effects on individual rights on the ground); Lauren Gilbert,
Patchwork Immigration Laws and Federal Enforcement Priorities (June 26, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2093486 (concluding that the decision was
“largely a reaffirmation of federal supremacy with regard to the immigration power and a
warning call to states to refrain from copycat laws,” noting in particular the majority’s robust
application of the doctrine of obstacle preemption).
23
Chacón, supra note 22, at 12.
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is entirely possible that this provision will later be enjoined on preemption grounds
if it is implemented in ways that are inconsistent with federal priorities, or on Fourth
or Fourteenth Amendment grounds if it results in unreasonably lengthy stops or widespread racial profiling.24 But the Court made it clear that a sub-federal jurisdiction
can require its officers to make inquiries into the immigration status of individuals
in otherwise lawful encounters with law enforcement.25 As this Article will explain,
the Court’s decision invites inevitable discrimination and harassment of minority
citizen groups and lawful migrants in contravention of the requirements of federal
immigration law.
Part I of this Article outlines the Court’s immigration federalism jurisprudence,
focusing on its recent decisions, with particular attention to Arizona v. United States.
In cases leading up to Arizona v. United States, the Court suggested that it might
allow a much larger role for states in the creation and enforcement of immigration
laws. But in the Arizona decision itself, the Court backed away from such suggestions, and hewed to a fairly traditional understanding of federal exclusivity, at least
formally. This formal adherence to traditional federalism doctrine was hailed by some
as a victory for the federal government and for federal primacy in immigration law.
But the apparent triumph of federal primacy is illusory.
Part II explores the reasons that the Court’s formal adherence to traditional notions of immigration federalism will fail to translate into federal primacy in practice.
Succinctly put, traditional judicial articulations of immigration federalism do not
account for the sub-federal immigration enforcement discretion that has accumulated over the past two decades. Following the last round of comprehensive immigration reform in 1986, scholarly, legal, and political consensus seemed to exist around
the notion that states and localities would play a limited role in immigration enforcement; a role that was largely confined to making occasional arrests for immigration
crimes and in some cases notifying federal enforcement agents of immigration violators in state or local custody.26 By 2010, an entirely different vision of state and
local participation in immigration enforcement had replaced the older, more limited
one. This Part maps these changes, and also demonstrates how the existing case law
on immigration policing relies on a delineation between federal and sub-federal
policing that has become increasingly illusory.
Part III of this Article unpacks the Court’s decision in United States v. Arizona to
explain why the seemingly traditional approach to federalism espoused by the Court
24

See id. at 1–2 (discussing the likelihood of a proliferation of challenges alleging
racial profiling).
25
Id. at 8.
26
See LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW 5–6 (2006); see also Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 575–76 (2008); Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 367, 369 (2010) (arguing that “immigration law has been traditionally understood to be an exclusive national issue—and thus distinct
and separate from the local focus of local government law”).
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actually represents a substantial reformulation of immigration federalism principles.
As previously noted, over the past two decades, sub-federal participation became
a significant feature of the immigration enforcement landscape.27 Much of this participation was not sanctioned by federal immigration law, and recently, the federal
government’s immigration enforcement policies have moved in a direction aimed
at bringing sub-federal enforcement efforts more closely into alignment with the letter of federal immigration law.28 The Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States is
insufficiently attentive both to the letter of federal immigration law and to the efforts
of the federal government to move closer toward aligning practices with the letter
of the law. Consequently, the Court’s seemingly limited concessions to state authority in Arizona v. United States actually cede significant enforcement powers to subfederal entities contrary to the requirements of federal immigration law. In the absence
of federal legislation to normalize the status of some or all of the estimated 11.2 million unauthorized migrants in the United States,29 state and local law enforcement will
substantially shape immigration enforcement and the immigrant experience in the
United States, notwithstanding the Court’s formal endorsement of federal primacy.
I. ACADEMIC IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM: THE LAW ON THE BOOKS
S.B. 1070 is one of many state and local ordinances30 that aim to do indirectly
what a long line of constitutional case law indicates that they cannot do directly—
regulate immigration.31 As a legal matter, the bill’s attempt to insert the state into
immigration policy contravenes clearly accepted legal wisdom. By the time that the
Supreme Court decided the Chinese Exclusion Case32 in 1889, the Court had articulated the principle that Congress has plenary power to regulate immigration.33 Other
cases decided in the latter half of the nineteenth century affirmed the central role of
the federal government—as opposed to the states—in setting immigration policy.34

27

See, e.g., James Pinkerton, Localized Immigration Enforcement on Rise, HOUS. CHRON.,
Oct. 9, 2007, at A1.
28
See discussion infra notes 347–48 and accompanying text.
29
JEFFREY PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., PEW RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, 1 (2011), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and
-state-trends-2010/.
30
Other state and local ordinances are discussed, see infra notes 83, 248–54 and accompanying text.
31
See Arizona, DREAM, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS (July 2012), http://migration.ucdavis.edu
/rmn/more.php?id=1702_0_4_0 (referring to SB 1070’s sub-federal regulation of immigration).
32
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
33
Id.
34
See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875) (holding state laws
governing immigration unconstitutional).
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Justice Scalia’s dissent in Arizona v. United States hearkens to the early days of the
Republic, when states and localities played the dominant role in immigration law and
its enforcement.35 But by the late nineteenth century, the case law clearly established
an absolute36 and largely unreviewable federal authority to enact through Congress,
and enforce through the executive branch, the nation’s immigration laws.37 In the
period that followed, even state statutory schemes that did not expressly conflict
with congressional enactments were deemed preempted where they sought to regulate an area such as alien registration, for which Congress had already developed a
comprehensive statutory framework.38 Thus, the Court struck down Pennsylvania’s
alien registration scheme in spite of the fact that it did not expressly conflict with the
operation of the later-adopted federal scheme.39 The lesson was clear: the regulation
of immigration was a matter for the federal government.
Over the past several decades, however, the Court has acknowledged some limited
spaces for state and local involvement in immigration enforcement. Prior to the decisions of the Roberts Court, the most notable case in this regard was DeCanas v. Bica.40
The question before the Court was whether a California law that imposed sanctions
35

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–13 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For
scholarly discussions of this early history, see, for example, ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION
BY DESIGN 99–118 (2006) (discussing various state immigration regulations); Kerry Abrams,
The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353
(2009) (discussing both exclusionary and inclusionary provisions enacted by states and territories to shape immigrant flows); Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law
(1776–1785), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) (documenting and describing various state immigration regulations in the early days of the Republic). Justice Scalia actually cites to Neuman’s
seminal piece in his dissent. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36
See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (“The passage of laws which
concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to
Congress, and not to the States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations:
the responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution,
belongs solely to the national government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.”).
37
See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (“The power to
exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress,
and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required
by the paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene.”).
38
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (“[W]here the federal government,
in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation
and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law,
or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.”).
39
Id. at 67–68.
40
424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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on employers who hired noncitizens unauthorized to work in the United States impermissibly infringed on federal immigration powers.41 The Court rejected the legal
challenge to the California law, concluding that, in the absence of a comprehensive
federal scheme to regulate the employment of unauthorized workers, California’s
law was not preempted by federal immigration law.42 DeCanas acknowledged the
power of states to regulate immigration-related matters that fall under the states’
traditional police powers (in this case, employment), provided the states’ laws do
not conflict with federal immigration law.43 The Court was able to distinguish Hines
because of the absence of a comprehensive federal statutory scheme governing the
employment of unauthorized workers.44 In the years that followed the case, Congress
did enact comprehensive legislation to address this issue. Specifically, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)45 developed a statutory scheme requiring
employers to maintain records of employees’ work eligibility, penalizing employers
who hire unauthorized workers, and protecting authorized workers from discriminatory hiring practices.46 Thus, the Roberts Court had a chance to revisit the Court’s
ruling in DeCanas in the face of further sub-federal efforts to regulate the employment of unauthorized workers.47
Interestingly, another case to suggest a space for sub-federal immigration regulation was Plyler v. Doe,48 a case that is generally considered the high water mark
of constitutional protection of the rights of unauthorized noncitizens.49 In that case,
which involved a challenge to a Texas law that would have required undocumented
students to pay to attend public primary and secondary school, the Supreme Court
struck down the state law on equal protection grounds.50 But in so doing, the Court
suggested that a state “might have an interest in mitigating the potentially harsh
economic effects of sudden shifts in population.”51 While “the State has no direct
41

Id. at 352–53.
Id. at 356–58.
43
Id. at 356–57.
44
Id. at 362–63. At the time DeCanas was decided, the immigration statute’s harboring
provision expressly excluded employment from the harboring definition, which made it clear
that Congress had expressly declined to criminalize the employment of unauthorized workers.
See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 1154 (2009). The harboring exclusion was known as the “Texas Proviso” in honor
of the state that most wanted the exception to exist. Id.
45
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
46
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324b (2006).
47
See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). Further discussion of
Whiting follows infra Part I.A.
48
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
49
See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN 65–66 (2006) (describing Plyler as
the “ultimate aliens’ rights decision”).
50
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210–16.
51
Id. at 228.
42
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interest in controlling entry into this country . . . unchecked unlawful migration
might impair the State’s economy generally, or the State’s ability to provide some
important service.”52 The Court went on to write “we cannot conclude that the
States are without any power to deter the influx of persons entering the United States
against federal law, and whose numbers might have a discernible impact on traditional state concerns.”53 This language in Plyler is obviously dicta.54 Nevertheless,
like DeCanas, it signaled that there may be spaces and occasions when sub-federal
regulation of immigration matters might be permissible.55 Both cases left unanswered
the question of precisely how much leeway states have to regulate immigration.
Until recently, the Court did not have the opportunity to explore the scope of
state authority to regulate immigration.56 In the intervening years, the most highprofile attempt by a state to regulate certain aspects of immigration—California’s
Proposition 187—was enjoined by a district court57 and the State subsequently
abandoned its defense of the law.58 But in the past two years, the Court has issued
two major decisions on the topic: Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting59 and Arizona
v. United States. Although these decisions modestly expand the potential sphere of
state immigration policymaking and enforcement, the cases have generally hewed
surprisingly close to traditional lines. As will be explained further in Part II, shifts
in immigration enforcement practices, not in the jurisprudence, have fundamentally
transformed the role of sub-federal actors in immigration enforcement.
A. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: Feints Toward a More
Permissive Immigration Federalism
The Whiting case60 involved a facial challenge to an Arizona state law—the
Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA)—that allows the superior courts of Arizona to
52

Id. at 228 n.23 (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354–56 (1976)).
Id. (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354–56); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J.
251, 269–71 (2011) (discussing DeCanas and Plyler as creating possible space for future
state enforcement of immigration law).
54
See Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of Local Immigration
Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 485, 489–91 (2010) (describing
the prevalence of sub-federal immigration regulation).
55
See id.
56
See id. at 492–93 (noting recent challenges to state immigration laws).
57
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(enjoining Proposition 187 on preemption grounds).
58
See Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won’t Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending Court Battles,
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1999, http://articles.latimes.com/print/1999/jul/29/news/mn-60700. One
of Proposition 187’s main legal problems was that it ran directly afoul of Plyler. See League of
United Latin Am. Citizens, 980 F. Supp. at 774.
59
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
60
For my earlier analysis of Whiting see Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2012). I draw on that analysis here.
53
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suspend or revoke the business licenses of employers who knowingly and intentionally hire unauthorized noncitizen workers.61 The law creates a procedure by which anyone can submit a complaint about a business’s hiring practices to the state’s Attorney
General or a county attorney.62 The submission of such a complaint requires the official to investigate the claim and, if it is found to be neither false nor frivolous, to
bring action against the employer.63 A first violation requires the employer to terminate unauthorized workers and to comply with reporting requirements.64 A second
violation results in permanent revocation of the employer’s business license.65
The Act also requires all employers to participate in E-Verify—the federal automated program that allows employers to verify the work eligibility of employees.66
Under federal law, participation in the E-Verify program is voluntary.67 The Arizona
law imposes no penalties for the failure to use E-Verify, but it does provide that participation in E-Verify creates a presumption of good faith compliance.68
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States and various business and civil
rights organizations sued to enjoin the law on the grounds that it was expressly and
impliedly preempted by federal immigration regulation—and specifically by the provisions of IRCA.69 The federal district court rejected the challenge, finding that the
law complemented IRCA,70 which expressly precludes only state regulation “other
than through licensing and similar laws.”71 Although the plaintiffs argued that LAWA
was not a “licensing” or “similar” law, the court disagreed.72 Classifying LAWA as
a licensing scheme, the court found that LAWA fell within IRCA’s savings clause
and was not preempted.73 The Ninth Circuit agreed.74
The plaintiffs also argued that even if federal law did not expressly preempt
Arizona’s employer sanctions law, LAWA was impliedly preempted because it was
inconsistent with federal law providing for the voluntary use of E-Verify.75 The district court rejected that argument, and the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the district
court on this point, also found that the E-Verify program was one that Congress had
“implicitly strongly encouraged by expanding its duration and its availability (to all
61

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2012).
Id. § 23-212(B).
63
Id. § 23-212(B)–(D).
64
Id. § 23-212(F)(1).
65
Id. § 23-212(F)(2).
66
Id. § 23-214(A).
67
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011).
68
Id. at 1975–77.
69
Chicanos por la Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
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fifty states).”76 The Ninth Circuit also upheld the district court’s rejection of the claim
that IRCA’s antidiscrimination provision impliedly preempted the Arizona scheme
because “Congress requires employers to use either E-Verify or I-9, and appellants
have not shown that E-Verify results in any greater discrimination than I-9.”77
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Whiting case on December 8,
2010.78 On May 26, 2011, it issued its decision.79 The decision, authored by Chief
Justice Roberts, did not significantly expand states’ abilities to regulate immigration
law.80 It did contain dicta that hinted that the Court was planning to apply a more
limited version of obstacle preemption in future cases,81 but the Court’s later decision in Arizona v. United States declined to seize or expand upon this dicta in the
Whiting case.82
Like the lower courts, the Supreme Court in Whiting found that LAWA’s business license suspension provision83 was a licensing scheme that fell within IRCA’s
savings clause in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2), which allows for state regulation of the
employment of unauthorized workers through “licensing and similar laws.”84 The
Court thus rejected the express preemption argument raised by the Chamber of
Commerce.85 That portion of the opinion was discrete, for it was limited by its facts
to the carve-out language of IRCA, and is unlikely to be particularly instructive in
other contexts.
But the Chamber of Commerce had also argued that LAWA was preempted on
an implied preemption theory of obstacle preemption because it upset the carefully
balanced immigration enforcement and antidiscrimination goals of the federal immigration scheme.86 Like the lower courts before it, the Supreme Court rejected this
claim as well.87 The Court noted that the state law tracked the federal scheme both
76

Id. at 867.
Id. Separately, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that LAWA’s sanction provisions violated due process. Id. at 867–68.
78
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
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Id.
80
Id.
81
Lauren Gilbert, Immigration Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of
McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 181–82 (2012).
82
See infra Part I.B.
83
The Supreme Court noted that Arizona was not alone in enacting such a provision and
cited comparable provisions that have been enacted in Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1975 & n.2. The
Court did not note in the decision, but was certainly aware of the fact that some localities
have also enacted similar provisions. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d
477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (considering the constitutionality of one such ordinance), vacated sub
nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
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Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977–81.
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Id. at 1981, 1983.
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77

588

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:577

in how it defined authorized workers and how it defined offenses, arguably suggesting
that state laws that mirror the federal scheme are less likely to be deemed to conflict
with or pose an obstacle to federal law.88 The Court then noted that Congress expressly welcomed state licensing laws in this area.89 “The balancing process that culminated in IRCA resulted in a ban on hiring unauthorized aliens, and the state law
here simply seeks to enforce that ban. Implied preemption analysis does not justify
a ‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal
objectives’. . . .”90 To some commentators, this language suggested that the Court
was likely to take a skeptical and narrow view of obstacle preemption in future
immigration cases, including Arizona v. United States.91
In short, reading Whiting, one could potentially discern far more tolerance for
state immigration regulation than that which is found in prior case law.92 But the
question remained how far the Court would extend that reasoning in cases outside of
the IRCA carve-out. The answer—not very far—came with the Court’s next decision.
B. Arizona v. United States: Limiting Whiting; Reaffirming Federal Dominance
The Court’s most recent foray into immigration federalism came with the case of
Arizona v. United States. The case arose out of litigation over Arizona’s S.B. 1070.93
Section 1 of S.B. 1070 states in no uncertain terms that:
the intent of [S.B. 1070] is to make attrition through enforcement
the public policy of all state and local government agencies in
Arizona [and that] [t]he provisions of this act are intended to
work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and
presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully
present in the United States.94
To achieve this goal, S.B. 1070 amends or creates four sections of the Arizona Revised
Statutes that impose criminal liability on the basis of unauthorized presence in the
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Id. at 1982–84.
Id. at 1984–85.
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Id. at 1985.
91
See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 81, at 182–83 (describing the Court’s narrow application of
obstacle preemption and predicting that the Court’s evolving approach, if applied in future
cases, could give states broader latitude to enact bills like S.B. 1070).
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See id. at 205–07 (discussing the likelihood of Whiting providing lawmakers direction in
crafting state and local immigration law).
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Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012).
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Ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41).
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United States.95 Although proponents of the law argued that it merely “mirrors” federal
immigration law, this is clearly not the case,96 as the law creates criminal liability for
some conduct that is not criminal under federal law97 and imposes more stringent
penalties on other federally sanctioned conduct.98
S.B. 1070 also “imposes new duties and creates new powers designed to increase”
state and local law enforcement’s “investigation of immigration status, arrests of
removable noncitizens, reporting of undocumented status to federal authorities, and
assistance in removal by delivering removable noncitizens to federal authorities.”99
The overall point is to have state and local law enforcement more involved in all
phases of immigration enforcement.100 These provisions would allow peace officers
to make an arrest without a warrant based on probable cause if “[t]he person to be
arrested has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from
the United States,”101 and would require verification of the immigration status of a
person lawfully stopped on the basis of “reasonable suspicion . . . that a person is
an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.”102
The legal filings for injunctive relief certainly reflect the concern that the law
would result in unreasonable searches and seizures and discriminatory law enforcement, and raise these claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.103 But the
leading arguments against S.B. 1070—and indeed, the arguments that Federal District
Court Judge Bolton relied upon in enjoining the law—were arguments over federal
preemption.104 The briefs filed by the United States Department of Justice argued
that the Arizona law was preempted by federal immigration law.105 The government’s
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See Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070,
25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 50 (2010); see also Chacón, supra note 22, at 2.
96
For a complete dissection and rejection of the “mirror image” defense for sub-federal
immigration regulation in general and S.B. 1070 in particular, see generally Chin & Miller,
supra note 53.
97
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (West 2012) (criminalizing the act of working
without authorization).
98
See id. § 13-1509 (criminalizing an individual’s failure to carry alien registration papers
when that individual’s presence in the country is not legally authorized).
99
Chin et al., supra note 95, at 62; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-1051, 13-3883 (discussing enforcement of immigration laws and arrest by an officer without a warrant).
100
See § 1 (discussing how the goal of the act “is to make attrition through enforcement
the public policy” of Arizona state and local government agencies).
101
Id. § 13-3883.
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Id. § 11-1051(B).
103
Whiting Complaint, supra note 9, at 6, 56–58.
104
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 992–1006 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641
F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011).
105
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support
Thereof at 12–13, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10cv-1413-NVM).
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preemption argument relied on theories of both express and implied preemption,
with the government taking the position that the entire law was preempted.106
Judge Bolton ultimately declined to enjoin the entire statute, but she did enjoin
four provisions on preemption grounds.107 She first enjoined S.B. 1070 Section 2(B).108
That Section required Arizona officials to “make a reasonable attempt, when practicable, to determine an individual’s immigration status during any lawful stop, detention, or arrest where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is unlawfully
present in the United States.”109 It also required that “all persons who are arrested
have their immigration status verified prior to release.”110 Judge Bolton found that
the provision would impermissibly burden the federal government, which would
effectively be required to check on the status of any person arrested and detained by
Arizona officials under their expanded stop and arrest authority.111 She also noted
that these provisions impermissibly burden lawful permanent residents by subjecting them to harassment in contravention of existing federal immigration law.112 For
these reasons, she found that the U.S. government was likely to succeed on the merits on its claim that this particular provision of S.B. 1070 was unconstitutional on
a theory of implied conflict or obstacle preemption.113 She used similar reasoning
to strike down Section 6 of the law, which would have allowed Arizona officials to
conduct warrantless arrests when there is probable cause to believe that “the person
to be arrested has committed any public offense that makes the person removable
from the United States.”114
Section 3 would have made it a state crime for anyone to fail to comply with the
alien registration provisions of federal law if that person was not lawfully present
in the United States.115 Citing Hines v. Davidowitz,116 Judge Bolton held that the current federal alien registration requirements already create an integrated and comprehensive system of registration, and the Arizona provisions that created penalties
for failure to comply impermissibly altered the federal penalty scheme for noncompliance.117 She therefore enjoined the provisions on the ground that the federal
106

Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 991–92.
Id. at 1008.
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Id. at 989.
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Id. at 995.
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the task of figuring out what would constitute a removable offense was far too complex to
provide a workable basis upon which an officer could make a probable cause determination.
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Ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
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government was likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that these provisions
were preempted as in conflict with federal law.118
Finally, Judge Bolton held that Section 5(C), which made it a crime for someone unlawfully in the country to solicit work, was field preempted by IRCA.119 She
reasoned that Congress had enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme governing
the employment of noncitizens.120 This federal provision made it a crime to hire an
unauthorized worker, but did not criminalize the worker.121 Judge Bolton found that
Arizona’s attempt to make conduct criminal, that was not criminalized under federal
law, was inconsistent with the federal statutory scheme.122
Three notable provisions of the law were not enjoined in 2010. The first was a
provision that made it a criminal offense to:
(1) [t]ransport or move or attempt to transport or move an alien
in [Arizona], in furtherance of the illegal presence of the alien
in the United States . . . (2) [c]onceal, harbor, or shield or attempt to conceal, harbor or shield an alien from detection in
[Arizona] . . . [and] (3) [e]ncourage or induce an alien to come
to or reside in [Arizona] . . . .123
Judge Bolton concluded that the provision did not impermissibly regulate immigration or violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.124 Judge Bolton found that the provision was “directed at legitimate local concerns related to public safety”125 and that
“any incidental burden on interstate commerce is minimal in comparison with the
putative local benefits.”126 She therefore allowed this provision to stand in 2010.127
However, on September 5, 2012, in response to a lawsuit filed by various civil
rights organizations, Judge Bolton ultimately did issue a preliminary injunction of
118
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facto arrests without probable cause.” See Court Order at 2, 33–34, 36–38, Friendly House v.
Whiting (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV-10-1061-PHX-SRB) (dismissing some of the plaintiffs’
claims and denying others as moot).
119

592

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:577

these portions of Section 5 of S.B. 1070 on field and conflict preemption grounds.128
Relying on reasoning employed by the Eleventh Circuit in a challenge to similar
Georgia and Alabama laws, she found that federal law already comprehensively
regulated the crime of alien smuggling; that states could not separately criminalize
and prosecute smuggling offense; and that enforcement of the Arizona law could
not be achieved consistently with federal law.129 Most media accounts of Judge
Bolton’s September 5, 2012, order paid little attention to her injunction of S.B.
1070’s anti-smuggling provision, focusing primarily instead on Judge Bolton’s
decision to deny a preliminary injunction as to Section 2(B) in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s June 2012 decision.130 But the injunction of the anti-smuggling
provision is actually quite significant because some Arizona law enforcement
agencies have successfully targeted numerous noncitizens for prosecution under its
anti-smuggling provision and have effectively used this provision as a backdoor
means of regulating immigration.131
The second notable provision exempt from the injunction was a provision that
made minor changes to Arizona’s existing anti-smuggling law.132 As Judge Bolton
noted, in 2010, the United States did not expressly challenge the anti-smuggling
law, and she did not enjoin it.133 Arizona’s entire anti-smuggling provision continues to be the subject of litigation, however, because various civil rights organizations have successfully claimed that Sheriff Joe Arpaio of the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) has abused this and other provisions of law to make illegitimate arrests solely on the basis of immigration status.134 As a result of these
claims, the MCSO is currently enjoined from making arrests solely on the basis of
immigration status.135 Finally, Judge Bolton left intact a provision that would allow
Arizona citizens to sue Arizona officials for failing to enforce federal immigration
law to the full extent permitted by federal law.136
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On November 1, 2010, the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in the case.137 On
April 11, 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in its entirety.138
Arizona appealed the case to the Supreme Court.139 On June 25, 2012, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in the case.140
The Court first analyzed S.B. 1070 Section 3, the provision that created the new
state misdemeanor forbidding the “willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document” in violation of federal law.141 The Court found Arizona’s alien
registration provision to be field preempted, declaring that “the Federal Government
has occupied the field of alien registration” with its comprehensive registration
scheme,142 thereby impliedly preempting Arizona’s efforts to create auxiliary—and
slightly more severe143—penalties for failure to comply with the federal scheme.144
Like the lower courts, the Supreme Court relied heavily on its 1941 ruling in Hines v.
Davidowitz the Court’s earlier field preemption decision concerning an alien registration scheme.145 “Where Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the field
of alien registration, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field
preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the
area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”146 Of course, unlike the Pennsylvania
scheme at issue in Hines v. Davidowitz,147 the Arizona law closely mapped onto the
federal registration scheme.148 But this made no difference to the Court, which found
that there was no room for additional state action, even complementary state action,
given the existence of a comprehensive federal scheme.149
The Court next evaluated Section 5(C), which made it a state misdemeanor for
“an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place
137

See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
845 (2011).
138
Id. at 366. The judges were unanimous in their conclusions as to two of the four enjoined provisions: Sections 3 and 5(C). See Arizona, 641 F.3d 399. Judge Bea dissented with
regard to two provisions—Sections 2(B) and 6—which he believed were not preempted by
federal law. Id. at 391 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
140
Id. I wrote an expert commentary on the decision for the Lexis Emerging Issues Series.
Chacón, supra note 22. The description of the case that forms the remainder of this section
borrows from my analysis in that short commentary.
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Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(A) (West Supp.
2011)).
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Id. at 2502.
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or perform work as an employee or independent contractor.”150 Citing its 2011
decision in Whiting, the Court concluded that, unlike the federal alien registration
scheme, the IRCA provisions do not fully occupy the field with regard to the employment of unauthorized workers.151 Indeed, the carve-out provision at issue in
Whiting expressly allows for certain sub-federal regulation in the field.152 Thus,
there is room for states to legislate in this area. But the Court rejected the notion
that Arizona’s legislation was compatible with the federal scheme.153 The Court concluded that “[a]lthough § 5(C) attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal
law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a conflict in the method
of enforcement.”154 The Court reasoned that the legislative history of IRCA reflects
Congress’s consideration of and rejection of criminal sanctions for workers.155 Thus,
the Court concluded that the Section was unconstitutional on a theory of obstacle
or conflict preemption.156
This was the first signal that the Court was not planning to follow the logic of
Whiting toward more restrained obstacle preemption analyses on questions of immigration federalism. The Court could have concluded that Arizona’s goals were
consonant with the federal goals, and that the State was using the federal classifications for permissible employment and therefore, that the legislation could coexist
comfortably with the federal scheme.157 Such a conclusion arguably would have been
supported by Justice Robert’s warning in Whiting against “freewheeling judicial
inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives.”158 But the
Court declined to go down this road, instead employing a fairly robust approach to
the obstacle preemption inquiry.159
The next provision scrutinized by the Court was Section 6, which provided that
a state officer “without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable
cause to believe [that the person] has committed any public offense that makes [him]
removable from the United States.”160 The Court observed that even immigration
officers do not necessarily have the authority to arrest someone upon having probable cause of removability.161 In the absence of a federal warrant, arrest based upon
150
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probable cause of removability is permitted only in a limited, statutorily prescribed
set of circumstances.162 The Court therefore concluded that Section 6 provided
Arizona’s officials with “greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible
removability than Congress has given to trained immigration officers.”163 The Court
also concluded that the result would be “unnecessary harassment of some aliens . . .
whom federal officials determine should not be removed.”164 Finally, the Court noted
that the federal statute specifies the circumstances under which state officers are
entitled to perform the functions of immigration officers, such as by operation of a
formal agreement with the federal government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).165
Arizona’s arrest authority is far more capacious.166
Here again, the Court arguably could have concluded that Arizona’s law was
reasonably consonant with federal law.167 Indeed, as Justice Alito wrote in his dissent, “[s]tate and local officers do not frustrate the removal process by arresting
criminal aliens.”168 It is possible to view the statutory scheme as one that fosters
Arizona’s cooperation with federal enforcement.169 But the majority rejected the
notion that this was “cooperation.”170 “There may be some ambiguity as to what
constitutes cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the
term would incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for
being removable absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal
Government.”171 Because the arrest authority was broader than federal authority and
unauthorized by federal law, the Court found that the provision created “an obstacle
to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”172 Once again, the Court was engaged in a fairly robust application of obstacle preemption principals, notwithstanding the suggestion in Whiting of the desirability of another possible approach.173
The final provision addressed by the Court was Section 2(B), which requires
officers to request proof of status during otherwise lawful seizures upon “reasonable
suspicion” that a person was unlawfully present.174 Section 2(B) also requires the
determination of an individual’s immigration status before the person is released after
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a lawful arrest.175 This Section was the most controversial of the law’s provisions,176
and the only one that the Supreme Court upheld.177
The Court’s legal reasoning is understandable. Section 2(B) does not come into
play unless there is a legitimate state law enforcement justification for the initial
detention or arrest.178 Even without Section 2(B), Arizona officials are authorized
to confer with federal officials about an individual’s immigration status, and federal
law requires that the federal government respond to such communications from state
actors.179 The federal government purportedly encourages such communications.180
Therefore, the Court did not see a problem with the state authorizing or requiring
immigration status checks during otherwise lawful stops or arrests.181
Moreover, the Court read the powers that Section 2(B) bestows on state officials quite narrowly.182 The Court assumed for purposes of its conclusion that any
stop or arrest would not be prolonged by an immigration status inquiry, and it suggested that if a stop was prolonged for purposes of the immigration inquiry alone,
it might well run afoul of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable
seizures.183 The Court declined to reach the issue of whether an otherwise lawful
detention could be prolonged lawfully on the basis of reasonable suspicion of illegal
entry or another immigration crime,184 and it did not even suggest that prolonging
an otherwise lawful detention could be justified on the ground of suspected civil
immigration violations (such as overstaying a student visa).185
The Court therefore upheld the provision by reading Section 2(B) as not creating
any additional arrest or detention powers over and above those that state officials
already exercised in their ordinary law enforcement duties.186 Because the Court read
Section 2(B) as merely making a set of constitutional enforcement practices into
state policy, it found no reason to strike down the provision.187 The Court also left
the door wide open for “other preemption and constitutional challenges,”188 thus
175
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issuing a clear warning that if the law is implemented in ways that conflict with federal
immigration law, resulting in unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment, or
in racial profiling in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the law will still be subject to constitutional challenges.189 Indeed, such challenges are already underway.190
As a legal matter, Arizona v. United States makes no clear break from prior law.
It reiterates a strong federal role in immigration policy and applies a fairly robust
version of obstacle preemption in striking down Sections 5(C) and 6.191 As David
Martin noted early on, the Arizona decision also rejects the “mirror image” theory of
sub-federal immigration regulation.192 And yet the decision was greeted with significant concern by the President of the United States and by immigrants’ rights advocates throughout the country.193 The concern was based on a notion that Section 2(B),
which seems so innocuous in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Arizona case,194
would actually allow for the exercise of tremendous state power to regulate the lives
of immigrants in ways that fueled discriminatory policing practices.195 It is almost
certainly the case that it will. But this is not because of any recent, radical transformation in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Instead, it is because of a gradual and substantial transformation in the socio-legal context of immigration policing—one that
has taken place over the past two decades. The next section describes those changes.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM—THE SOCIO-LEGAL STORY
Reading Arizona v. United States, one might assume that not much has changed
in the world of immigration federalism.196 The fact, however, is that the situation
has changed substantially, but this change has come as a result of shifting enforcement policies, and not as an edict of the Supreme Court. Following the last round of
comprehensive immigration reform in 1986, scholarly, legal and political consensus
seemed to exist around the notion that states and localities would play a limited role
189
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See Statement on the Supreme Court Ruling on Arizona’s Illegal Immigrant Enforcement Legislation, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201200509 (June 25, 2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200509/pdf/DCPD-201200509.pdf; see also ACLU
Officials Respond, supra note 176 (discussing the views of American Civil Liberties Union
directors); Supreme Court Issues Ruling on Arizona Anti-Immigrant Law, NAT. IMMIGR. L.
CENTER (June 25, 2012), http://www.nilc.org/nr062512.html.
194
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–10.
195
See ACLU Officials Respond, supra note 176.
196
See Gilbert, supra note 22 (concluding that Arizona confirmed federal power in the
area of immigration).
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in immigration enforcement;197 this role was largely confined to making occasional
arrests for immigration crimes and in some cases notifying federal enforcement
agents of immigration violators in state or local custody.198 By 2010, an entirely
different vision of state and local participation in immigration enforcement had
replaced the older, more limited one.199 State and local law enforcement had become
the primary point of contact for many noncitizens coming into contact with the
removal system and the federal executive branch has been the main architect of this
new order.200 This section maps the changing socio-legal landscape of immigration
enforcement. Subsection A discusses changes in immigration enforcement at the
federal and sub-federal level. Subsection B discusses the static legal regime governing enforcement, which does not account for the new enforcement realities.
A. The Changing Nature of Immigration Enforcement
Over the past twenty years, states and localities have become increasingly involved in defining immigration policy and in enforcing immigration laws.201 The
forces that have brought states and localities to this larger role have come from above
and below. On the one hand, greater sub-federal involvement in immigration enforcement has been authorized by Congress and, more importantly, instrumentalized
by federal executive branch policies and pronouncements.202 On the other hand, some
of this involvement has been generated by entrepreneurial efforts at the state and
local level that have moved the baselines of acceptable state and local involvement
in immigration policy.203

197

See Cecilia Renn, State and Local Enforcement of the Criminal Immigration Statutes
and the Preemption Doctrine, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999 (1987); Linda R. Yanez & Alfonso
Soto, Local Police Involvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law, 1 TEX. HISP. J.L.
& POL’Y 9 (1994); see also supra note 26.
198
See Renn, supra note 197, at 1003–04.
199
See Anita Sinha & Richael Faithful, State Battles Over Immigration: The Forecast
for 2012, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (2012), available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement
/cb04adc6a402a87838_s2m6i2sx0.pdf.
200
See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1579–81 (2010).
201
I previously analyzed a number of these trends, which also have the effect of increasing
the criminalization of migration. See Chacón, supra note 60, at 116–30.
202
See discussion infra notes 222–25.
203
See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Karthick Ramakrishnan, The Anti-Immigrant
Game, L.A. TIMES, April 24, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/24/opinion/la-oe-gula
-immigration-law-politics-20120424 (discussing the authors’ findings concerning the role of
issue entrepreneurs in “choos[ing] venues for immigration enforcement schemes that are politically receptive to immigration restrictions” and promoting laws that reformulate the legal
baseline of sub-federal immigration enforcement).
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Given the widespread acceptance of the principle—rearticulated in Arizona v.
United States—that the federal government controls immigration policy,204 one
would assume that any delegation of that power would come from Congress. But
congressional inertia in the area of immigration reform has meant that Congress’s
role in the transforming landscape of immigration federalism has been slight.205 This
is not to say, however, that Congress has been irrelevant. In 1996, Congress made
four important changes to the immigration code with the goal of increasing state and
local cooperation in immigration enforcement.206 First, with the passage of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1998 (AEDPA),207 Congress authorized
state officers to arrest and detain noncitizens who had “previously been convicted
of a felony in the United States.”208 Second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)209 added a provision to the immigration law allowing the Attorney General to empower local officials to enforce
civil immigration laws in instances involving “an actual or imminent mass influx
of aliens . . . [that] presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal
response.”210 Third, IIRIRA added Section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality
Act211 (INA), which allowed the Attorney General to delegate immigration enforcement authority to state and local police pursuant to a formal agreement between the
state or local agency and the Department of Justice.212 Fourth, Congress prohibited
states and localities from barring their employees from reporting immigration status
information to the federal government and required the federal government to respond to sub-federal agency inquiries concerning citizenship or immigration status
“for any purpose authorized by law.”213 All of these changes were made against a

204

See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498–99 (2012).
Sinha & Faithful, supra note 199, at 1, 4.
206
See Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local Police, BACKGROUNDER (Nat’l
Immigration Forum, Wash. D.C.), Aug. 2007, at 3–4, available at http://www.immigrationforum
.org/images/uploads/Backgrounder-StateLocalEnforcement.pdf; see also Chacón, supra note 200,
at 1580.
207
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (2006)).
208
Id. § 439(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276.
209
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-646 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006)).
210
Id.
211
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
212
Id.
213
Pub. L. 104-208, § 642(c), 110 Stat. No. 3009, 3009-707 (1996) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006)). The Act read:
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal,
State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity
or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and
205
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backdrop of legislation that gave states increased authority to deny certain services
and benefits to noncitizens, particularly those present without authorization.214
Members of Congress were reacting (in a limited way) to pressure from constituencies seeking a greater role for states and localities in immigration policy and
enforcement215—such as the advocates of California Proposition 187.216 These
changes to the law allowed for limited and controlled state and local participation
in immigration enforcement.217 These provisions refute any notion that states have
inherent authority to enforce immigration laws. These specific, limited grants of
enforcement power are the only immigration enforcement powers that Congress has
formally authorized for states and localities.218 The changes to the law signal noteworthy changes in the role that states and localities play in immigration enforcement,
but the limited nature of these changes suggests that Congress continued to envision
a limited role for sub-federal actors in immigration enforcement. Even the events
of September 11, 2001, did not prompt any fundamental legislative changes in this
regard.219 The only immigration “policy” that Congress has consistently and enthusiastically supported over the past decade is the increased funding of the immigration
Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful, or unlawful, of any individual.
(b) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY OF GOVERNMENT ENTITIES.—
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no
person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State,
or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect
to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of
any individual:
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such
information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(2) Maintaining such information.
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or
local government entity.
(c) OBLIGATION TO RESPOND TO INQUIRIES.—The Immigration
and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State,
or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the
agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested
verification or status information.
Id. § 642, 110 Stat. No. at 3009-707.
214
See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1840–43 (2007).
215
See Chacón, supra note 200, at 1579–80.
216
See Chacón, supra note 214, at 1840–41.
217
See Chacón, supra note 200, at 1579.
218
See id. at 1579–80 (discussing the extent to which states can enforce immigration laws).
219
See id. at 1581 (describing the United States Department of Justice’s policy on local and
state immigration enforcement).
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enforcement bureaucracy, which is charged with enforcing the nation’s outmoded
immigration laws.220
But if Congress was largely inert, the executive branch moved much more aggressively in developing immigration policy, first expanding and then seeking to
limit state and local law enforcement efforts into immigration enforcement. In the
years immediately after September 11, 2001, the executive branch engaged in unprecedented expansions of state and local power in enforcement—an expansion that
has ebbed in more recent years. First, in the post–9/11 era, the executive branch used
the immigration enforcement and detention system as a primary site of domestic
anti-terrorism policy, notwithstanding the lack of nexus between much of the immigration enforcement and any actual terrorist threat.221 One important element of this
increased enforcement was the federal government’s increasing reliance on state
and local law enforcement as a primary site of immigration enforcement.222
Michael Wishnie describes the three distinct initiatives that generated this increased involvement. The first was a shift in the Department of Justice away from
its traditional position that state and local officials lacked the power to enforce civil
immigration laws in favor of the unprecedented position that they had the “inherent
authority” to enforce these laws.223 The second was the decision to have the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enter several categories of civil immigration
information into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database that all law
enforcement agents can access during routine policing.224 Third, the Attorney General
and his senior staff used informal methods to encourage state and local police departments to prioritize immigration enforcement and to make immigration arrests.225
These developments in executive policy led to a fundamental change in the culture
of some state and local law enforcement agencies. Whereas once these agencies had
assumed that their role in immigration enforcement was marginal at best, some now
came to view immigration enforcement as a core function.226 Interest in immigration

220

For a discussion of recent trends in funding, see Chacón, supra note 60, at 118.
See Chacón, supra note 214, at 1854–61.
222
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1085 (2004).
223
Id. at 1085–86. For further discussion of this major policy shift see Chacón, supra note
200, at 1581 (summarizing the change); Chacón, supra note 60, at 127–28 (describing the
change in policy); Wishnie, supra note 222, at 1088–95.
224
Wishnie, supra note 222, at 1086–87; see also Chacón, supra note 200, at 1587–88.
225
Wishnie, supra note 222, at 1087. Wishnie contends that this exercise of state and local
power is unconstitutional. See id. at 1088–1101; see also Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws
in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2004).
226
Perhaps the most notorious example of such a shift is that of Sheriff Joe Arpaio of
Maricopa County, Arizona, who went from believing that immigration enforcement was
outside of his jurisdiction to making it his trademark policy. See Terry Carter, The Maricopa
221
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enforcement spurred a number of states and localities to seek to enter into 287(g)
agreements that would allow them to enforce immigration laws, at least in a limited
way.227 Although the legislation providing for such agreements had been on the
books since 1996, it was not until after September 11, 2001, that the executive
branch actually began to implement such enforcement agreements with sub-federal
entities.228 The number of agreements proliferated in the years that followed; the
bulk of existing agreements were signed after 2006.229 Currently, there are sixtythree participating agencies in twenty-four states.230 Unfortunately, federal training of
sub-federal officials was inadequate,231 and the program was criticized for being poorly targeted232 and for contributing to racial profiling in law enforcement.233 Despite
the criticisms that these agreements generated, the Obama Administration chose to
continue the program.234 Under President Obama, existing 287(g) agreements were
revised and federal training and oversight was purportedly strengthened.235 However,
criticisms of the program have persisted.236 The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) recently has terminated 287(g) agreements upon findings that sub-federal
agents abused their immigration enforcement authority by engaging in patterns of racial profiling.237 This suggests that DHS is more closely monitoring implementation
Courthouse War, ABA J. Apr. 2010 at 43, 44–46 (2010); see also Eagly, supra note 131,
at 1753–67 (describing immigration enforcement in Maricopa County).
227
The oldest 287(g) agreement was signed in 2002. See Fact Sheet: Delegation of
Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited
Dec. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
228
Id.
229
RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A STUDY
OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 9 (Jan. 2011), available at http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf (indicating that sixty-five of the seventytwo 287(g) agreements in existence at the time of the report were signed after 2006).
230
Fact Sheet, supra note 227.
231
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROL NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009).
232
CAPPS ET AL., supra note 229, at 50 (recommending refocusing 287(g) programs on
serious offenders).
233
See Chacón, supra note 254, at 1616–19.
234
See Fact Sheet, supra note 227 (stating the number of 287(g) agreements still in enforcement under the Obama administration and listing a number of agreements signed in 2009).
235
See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 229, at 11.
236
Id. at 12.
237
Michael Biesecker, Feds Block NC Sheriff’s Access to ICE Database, VA. PILOT,
Sept. 19, 2012, http://hamptonroads.com/2012/09/feds-block-nc-sheriffs-access-ice-database
(reporting the termination of Alamance County’s 287(g) agreement in the wake of Justice
Department determinations that the Alamance County sheriff discriminatorily targeted Latinos
for policing); Statement by Secretary Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings of Discriminatory Policing
in Maricopa County, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.dhs
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of the agreements, or at least that DHS is unwilling to continue agreements in jurisdictions where DOJ has made findings of egregious acts of discrimination. The
program remains operational in sixty-three jurisdictions.238
The Secure Communities program dwarfs all other prior efforts to involve states
and localities in immigration enforcement,239 but it also signals an important shift
away from reliance on sub-federal discretion in enforcement, in favor of consolidating discretion at the federal level. From a federal perspective, the advantage of
Secure Communities is that it expands federal enforcement capacity by processing
information about local arrest without bestowing the increased enforcement powers
on sub-federal agents required by the 287(g) program. At least in theory, if not in
practice,240 discriminatory power concerning enforcement is shifted back to the
federal government. The first appropriations for the program were authorized in
December 2007.241 Currently, the program is operating in more than 3,000 jurisdictions across the country, including all jurisdictions along the United States–
Mexico border.242 As Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) describes the
program, the fingerprints of individuals arrested or booked by state or local officials,
which have long been submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), now
go through a second database as well.243
Under Secure Communities, the FBI automatically sends the fingerprints to DHS to check against its immigration databases. If
these checks reveal that an individual is unlawfully present in
the United States or otherwise removable due to a criminal conviction, ICE takes enforcement action—prioritizing the removal
of individuals who present the most significant threats to public
safety as determined by the severity of their crime, their criminal
history, and other factors—as well as those who have repeatedly
violated immigration laws.244
.gov/news/2011/12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory-policing-maricopa
-county (terminating Maricopa County’s 287(g) agreements, citing DOJ “findings of discriminatory policing practices within the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO)”).
238
See Fact Sheet, supra note 227.
239
See Chacón, supra note 200, at 1595–97.
240
In fact, at least some states and localities have modified their policing tactics in the
wake of the Secure Communities program, and the result has been an increase in discriminatory policing. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 258–61.
241
See Chacón, supra note 200, at 1595.
242
See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice
.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Secure Communities, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT].
243
Id.
244
Id.; see also Carrie L. Rosenbaum, Introduction to 287(g) Agreements, Secure Communities, and Immigration Detainers, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, 2010 EMERGING
ISSUES 5400 (2010).
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Defenders of the program argue that this is an ideal way to allow states and
localities to multiply the forces of immigration enforcement agencies in a way that
merely piggybacks on existing law enforcement efforts and therefore, generates no
negative racial profiling effects.245 Critics argue that the program’s existence encourages racial profiling.246 The charges have been viable enough that ICE recently has
taken systematic steps to address some of these concerns.247
Recent executive branch efforts to reconsolidate immigration enforcement discretion in the hands of the federal government have run up against a rising tide of
state and local laws designed to insert sub-federal actors in immigration enforcement. In recent years, there has been a rash of sub-federal ordinances aimed at immigrants,248 many of which include criminal provisions designed to trigger the
involvement of local law enforcement.249 Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the copycat legislation it inspired250 have received the bulk of the media attention, but local initiatives deal with everything from restrictions on renting to unauthorized migrants251

245

See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://
www.ice.gov/secure_communities/faq.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Frequently
Asked Questions].
246
See, e.g., Secure Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR. F., http://www.immigrationforum.org
/images/uploads/Secure_Communities.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Secure
Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR. F.].
247
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 245.
248
Wayne Cornelius, Preface to TAKING LOCAL CONTROL, at vii (Monica Varsanyi ed.,
2010) (“When the U.S. Congress failed to enact comprehensive immigration reform in 2006
and again in 2007, this failure—and the political paralysis that it signified—opened a veritable Pandora’s Box of state and local immigration control initiatives seeking to fill the
policy void. While there had been some significant attempts by the states in the 1990s to
legislate by ballot box in this area . . . there was a quantum leap in such policy activism in
2006 and 2007.”).
249
See, e.g., Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56,
2011 Ala. Acts 535, amended by H.B. 658 (Ala. 2012) (resembling Arizona’s S.B. 1070 in
its attempt to increase the role of local law enforcement in immigration enforcement).
250
See id.; Georgia Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, 2011 Ga.
Laws 252 (codified as amended in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. tits. 13, 16, 17, 35,
36, 42, 45, and 50); Act of May 10, 2011, Pub. L. No. 171-2011 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of IND. CODE ANN. tits. 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 22, 34, and 35); South Carolina
Illegal Immigration and Reform Act, 2008 S.C. Acts 280 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of S.C. CODE ANN. tits. 6, 8, 12, 16, 23, 40, 41, and 59); Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Laws 21 (codified as amended in scattered sections of UTAH CODE
ANN. tits. 76 and 77).
251
See, e.g., HAZLETON, PA., Ordinance 2006-18 (2006), invalidated by Lozano v. City
of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), affirmed in part, vacated in part by
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton,
Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011) (remanding in light of Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)).
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to solicitation of work252 to “alien smuggling”253 and human trafficking.254 These
laws provide local law enforcement with further facially legitimate law enforcement
reasons to engage in the policing of noncitizens.
With the nationwide implementation of the Secure Communities program and
the growth of local laws targeting migrants, the role of state and local law enforcement in immigration has shifted nearly 180 degrees in the last two decades. In the
mid-1990s, such involvement was rare.255 The limited attention given to the issue
by courts had resulted in the pronouncement that state and local officials were not
empowered to make civil immigration arrests,256 and this position was adopted by
the Department of Justice.257 In 2012, on the other hand, states and localities are not
only enabled but are required (and sometimes required against their will) to submit
arrest data for federal screening of immigration status, albeit indirectly.258 Officials in
many jurisdictions take an even more proactive role, either through participation in a
252

See, e.g., Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies
of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 490–95 (2005–2006) (discussing such ordinances in Redondo Beach and Los Angeles); see also Lopez v. Town of
Cave Creek, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1036 (D. Ariz. 2008) (granting a preliminary injunction
against a Cave Creek ordinance aimed at day-laborer solicitation); Cent. Am. Refugee Ctr.
v. City of Glen Cove, 753 F. Supp. 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (upholding local anti-solicitation
ordinances that prevented day laborers from congregating against equal protection and First
Amendment challenges).
253
Eagly, supra note 131, at 1768–70.
254
Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the
Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1643–50 (2010).
255
See Wishnie, supra note 222, at 1089, 1091.
256
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 476 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled in
part on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).
257
Memorandum from Seth Waxman, Assoc. Deputy Att’y, to the U.S. Att’y for the S.
Dist. of Cal. (Feb. 5, 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/immstopo1a.htm; see
also Wishnie, supra note 222, at 1085–86, 1090 (discussing the 1996 memorandum and subsequent policy changes).
258
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 245 (stating that “the information-sharing
partnership between DHS and the FBI that is the cornerstone of Secure Communities is
mandated by federal law, which means that state and local jurisdictions cannot prohibit
information-sharing between agencies in this respect”). Several jurisdictions have unsuccessfully sought to opt out and have attempted to limit their participation in the program in
other ways. See, e.g., Elise Foley, Secure Communities Immigration Checks Resisted in
District of Columbia, HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/06/04secure-communities-immigration-district-of-columbia_n_1569327.html; Martine Powers
& Stewart Bishop, Menino Threatens to Quit Plan Targeting Crime by Immigrants, BOSTON
.COM (July 11, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/07/11
/menino_threatens_to_quit_plan_targeting_crime_by_immigrants/; Karina Rusk, County Wants
Feds to Keep Hands Off Fingerprints, ABC NEWS (Sept. 28, 2010), http://abclocal.go.com
/kgo/story?section=news/local/south_bay&id=7694228 (noting that Santa Clara followed San
Francisco in attempting to opt out of the program).
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287(g) program, through the exercise of their purported “inherent authority” to perform immigration status checks during other law enforcement efforts,259 or through
the enforcement of state and local criminal law provisions aimed at migrants.260
Indeed, with the explosion of sub-federal involvement in immigration policing, it
seems that states and localities are, in many cases, actually exercising the discretion
that definitively shapes federal enforcement.261
B. The Static Legal Regime Governing Enforcement
While state and local law enforcement involvement in immigration policing has
exploded, enforcement agencies and courts have been insufficiently attentive to the
nuances that have long divided immigration policing from the forms of policing that
are generally the province of sub-federal law enforcement. Attention to these details
signals the potential pitfalls of sub-federal immigration enforcement. First, immigration policing is one of the few areas where the courts and the executive branch continue to expressly sanction the use of racial profiling.262 This has remained true even
after the Department of Justice prohibited the use of racial profiling in other forms
of policing; the exception for immigration policing was retained by the Department
of Justice in its 2003 memorandum prohibiting racial profiling.263 The enabling case
law, and the policies implementing it, rests upon stated assumptions that the law
enforcement agents who are relying on these forms of profiling will have a certain
level of expertise in immigration enforcement that will allow them to assimilate the
information about race into their superior training to attain accurate results.264 In
259

See Eagly, supra note 131, at 1777, 1780.
See id. at 1780 (discussing Arizona’s anti-smuggling law); see also Chacón, supra
note 254, at 147–50 (characterizing a number of state anti-trafficking efforts as backdoor
means of policing migration).
261
See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1819 (2011).
262
The Supreme Court sanctioned the use of “Mexican appearance” in conjunction with
other factors as a basis for reasonable suspicion in immigration policing. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975). The case continues to be cited with approval
and relied upon by the Justice Department in cases involving immigration policing. See Chin
et al., supra note 95, at 67.
263
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents
/guidance_on_race.pdf. For an analysis of the 2003 guideline, see Kevin R. Johnson, Racial
Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice’s 2003 Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REV.
67 (2004); see also Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of
the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for
Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010) (discussing the practical consequences
of Brignoni-Ponce when read in conjunction with Whren).
264
See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884–85 (1975).
260
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other words, these cases generally assume that trained federal immigration agents
are responsible for immigration enforcement.265
Second, citing the strong national security interest of the federal government in
effective policing of the borders, the Court has frequently deemed “reasonable”
seizures that would be unreasonable in other contexts.266 This allows for suspicionless searches at ports of entry, even where such searches have involved the disassembly of a gas tank267 or a review of laptop contents.268 It justifies thirty-six-hour
detentions and strip searches at ports of entry upon “reasonable suspicion.”269 It
allows for suspicionless referrals to secondary inspection at border checkpoints in
the interior of the country, even when such referrals are made on the basis of race.270
In short, the strong interest of the government in controlling national borders allows
for stops and searches that, in other contexts, would likely be deemed unreasonable,
and this has been true both at and away from the border.271
Third, in the context of otherwise lawful stops, the Court has been unreflectively
permissive about allowing federal officials to ask questions about an individual’s
immigration status.272 In the case of Muehler v. Mena,273 the Court confronted the
case of a landlady who was handcuffed early in the morning and detained for several hours by federal agents executing a warrant for the arrest of one of her tenants.274
During her detention, she was questioned about her immigration status by federal
immigration agents.275 She argued that her detention (including the questioning) constituted an unreasonable seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.276 The Court
concluded that the detention was reasonable277 and determined that the questioning
265

See, e.g., id. at 885.
For a more complete discussion of this “border exceptionalism” in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, see Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders,
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010). In this paragraph, I am summarizing some of the cases
discussed at length in that article. For additional discussion of several of the cases discussed
here, see Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 1543 (2011).
267
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
268
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert denied, Arnold v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
269
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
270
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
271
See Johnson, supra note 263, at 1075–76.
272
For a detailed criticism of this trend, see generally Anil Kalhan, The Fourth
Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1137 (2008).
273
544 U.S. 93 (2005).
274
Id. at 96.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
For this portion of the holding, the Court relied on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692 (1981), which upheld the detention of occupants of premises upon which police were
266
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did not constitute a separate seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.278 “We
have ‘held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.’”279
Analogizing the questioning to the use of drug-sniffing dogs, the Court found that
the questioning did not prolong the otherwise valid detention and that no further
justification was needed for Fourth Amendment purposes.280 This decision left wide
berth for federal immigration agents to engage in questioning about immigration
status during the course of otherwise lawful stops.281
Finally, courts have been reluctant to impose Fourth Amendment remedies in
removal proceedings that would be comparable to those available in criminal proceedings, with the result that there is less deterrence for Fourth Amendment violations in cases that are likely to end with removal, not criminal charges.282 In INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza,283 the Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule in civil removal
proceedings notwithstanding the apparent violation of the Fourth Amendment during a workplace raid.284 The Court reasoned that the application of the rule would
result in the loss of valuable evidence, and the costs would not be outweighed by
the minimal deterrence of constitutional violations that the application of the rule
would create.285 To explain why the Court felt that the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings would be low, the Court offered a number
of explanations, including the fact that most individuals will simply submit to removal rather than arguing for exclusion of evidence,286 that “the INS has its own
comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations,”287 and that
“[t]he possibility of declaratory relief against [the INS, a “single agency under
central federal control,”] . . . offers a means for challenging the validity of INS
practices.”288 The Court also justified its decision by noting the lack of evidence of
widespread violations in immigration proceedings and the difficulty of determining
the existence of Fourth Amendment violations in workplace raids.289 What is striking
attempting to execute an arrest warrant on the grounds that such detentions were necessary
to secure the scene and protect the safety of the officers. Mena, 544 U.S. at 98.
278
Id. at 100–01.
279
Id. at 101.
280
Id.
281
See United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 550
U.S. 946 (2007); see also United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007).
282
For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Chacón, supra note 200, at 1611–15.
283
468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
284
Id. at 1050.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 1044.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 1045.
289
Id. at 1043, 1049–50. This invited a response from the dissenting Justice White that
“this argument amounts to a rejection of the application of the Fourth Amendment to the activities of INS agents.” Id. at 1059 (White, J., dissenting).
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is the degree to which the Court assumes that individuals in removal proceedings
will arrive there as a result of federal immigration enforcement agents’ actions.290
These conditions form the backdrop for the Court’s immigration federalism decisions. The mismatch between the law governing immigration policing and the
realities of immigration policing are either unacknowledged or unreflectively embraced in Arizona v. United States.291
III. IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM ON THE GROUND NOW:
RE-READING ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES
Understanding the lay of the land in contemporary immigration enforcement
sheds light on both the questionable assumptions that undergird the Court’s reasoning in Arizona v. United States and the likely practical effect of the Court’s ruling.
Specifically, in upholding Section 2(B), the majority elided the distinction between
civil and criminal immigration enforcement and between the authority of federal immigration agents and other law enforcement officials.292 These elisions made the decision to uphold Section 2(B) read like a self-evident outgrowth of existing law.293 In
fact, this portion of the decision can also be read as the Court’s first legal endorsement of the vast expansion of the power of sub-federal immigration enforcement
that has taken place over the last decade,294 an expansion that the federal government is currently striving to bring back under its control.295 This section reviews the
decision in an attempt to expose the implicit assumptions at work in the majority’s
decision with regard to Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 and the likely practical effects of
these assumptions.
As previously noted, in Arizona, the Court reiterated its long-standing acknowledgement of federal primacy in immigration law and its enforcement.296 The Court
actually employed this traditional approach with regard to Section 3, 5(C) and 6 of
S.B. 1070,297 and as a result, these provisions of the law were struck down.298 But
with regard to Section 2(B), the Court implicitly took a different tack. The Court
accepted as lawful the ongoing sub-federal practices of participation in immigration
enforcement and used those practices as the baseline against which S.B. 1070 would
be measured, rather than assessing the law against the baseline of existing law.299
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299

Id. at 1048–49 (majority opinion).
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
See id. at 2504, 2508.
See id. at 2507–10.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 237–38.
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502–03, 2505–06.
Id. at 2502–03, 2505–06, 2509.
See id. at 2509–10.
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Section 2(B) requires that, during a “stop, detention or arrest,” a law enforcement agent make “a reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status of
the person” they have stopped.300 It also requires that any individual who has been arrested “shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is
released.”301 As the Supreme Court noted, the “accepted” way to check on an individual’s status is for the agent to contact ICE so that ICE can do a check of its database.302
The Court analyzed this provision from the questionable starting assumption
that individual officers are already empowered to do these status checks under existing law.303 If a local agent lawfully stops someone for a violation of the law—
such as driving under the influence of alcohol—the Court reasoned that there is
nothing in existing law that would prevent that agent from contacting ICE to ascertain the immigration status of the person stopped.304 Indeed, according to the Court,
Congress actually provided in the statute for communication between local agents
and the federal government on questions of immigration status and in 1996 required
the establishment of a system that would enable state and local agents to verify immigration status with the federal government.305 Although Congress did not require
a state or local agent to verify the immigration status of a detainee, the Court reasoned that there is no reason that the State of Arizona could not require this.306 The
Court assumed that the initial stop or detention would be lawfully grounded in a

300

Ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41).
301
Id.
302
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507. The ICE database has been subject to a variety of critiques, including the fact that individuals who are in status (including lawful permanent
residents) or who are citizens have in many cases not been cleared by a search of this
database. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Immigrants Are Matched to Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2009, at A13 (“According to ICE figures, about 5,880 people identified through the program
turned out to be United States citizens.”); Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Detention and the
Secure Communities Program, ANGEL ISLAND IMMIGR. STATION FOUND., http://www.aiisf.org
/about/articles/749-immigration-detention-and-the-secure-communities-program (last visited
Dec. 6, 2012) (referencing ICE officials’ admission that thousands of lawfully present U.S. citizens were wrongfully identified as a result of flaws in their database system in 2009); Secure
Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR. F., supra note 246; Joe Wolverton, II, States Ready to Fight
Feds on Immigration Program, THE NEW AM. (May 6, 2011), http://www.thenewamerican
.com/usnews/immigration/item/2098-states-ready-to-fight-feds-on-immigration-program
(critiquing the Secure Communities program, including the use of local policing in immigration
policy, misuse and flaws, and the costs of implementation).
303
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–08.
304
Id. at 2508.
305
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(10)(A), 1373(c) (2006)).
306
Id. The Court compares its reasoning with its decision in Whiting that a state could
mandate employer use of the E-Verify system, even though the federal law made the program
voluntary. Id.
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state or local law rationale and that merely stopping someone to ascertain status
would not be permissible under the law.307
Taken against these background assumptions, one could sensibly ask (as the
Court seems to) whether S.B. 1070’s Section 2(B) really even matters. State and
local officials who wanted to communicate with the federal government about an
individual’s immigration status already had plenty of tools at their disposal to do so,
even prior to the enactment of S.B. 1070.308 As a matter of fact, in Arizona, where
some local law enforcement agents have been vigorously enforcing Arizona’s antismuggling provision for years, individuals have not only been subjected to checks
of their immigration status during routine law enforcement stops, but they have had
suspicions about their status serve as the express and legal basis for those stops
upon an officer’s reasonable suspicion of violation of the anti-smuggling law, and
they have been subject to arrest and prosecution in state courts essentially because
of their immigration status.309
But one need not accept as a constitutional baseline the practices noted by the
Court. One may or may not have thought these practices were constitutional prior
to the decision in Arizona, but one could not plausibly argue that the constitutional
question had been decided one way or another. The Court treated ongoing practices
as a constitutional baseline in a way that certainly was not legally compelled.
The fact that Congress had previously sanctioned state law enforcement communications with ICE under certain circumstances310 did not make it a foregone legal
conclusion that the pre–S.B. 1070 practices or the practices permitted by S.B. 1070’s
Section 2(B) are constitutional. Arguably, Arizona’s reliance on the communication
provisions is overbroad. These provisions were aimed squarely at eliminating sanctuary ordinances that prohibited state and local officials from communicating to the
federal government known information about the unauthorized status of a person
in their custody.311 They were not intended to empower localities and states to investigate and punish immigration status.312 In case there were any doubts on that
point, Congress imposed specific limits on sub-federal agents seeking to investigate
and make arrests for immigration violations and crimes.313 Nor do the IIRIRA provisions requiring the federal government to respond to sub-federal inquiries about
immigration status authorize ongoing practices in Arizona and elsewhere. Those
307

See id. at 2508–09.
See Eagly, supra note 131, at 1777, 1780.
309
Id. at 1773. Of course, a recent lawsuit has challenged the legitimacy of these practices
due to the racial profiling endemic in its implementation, and thus far, federal courts have
been receptive to the challenge. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012).
310
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.
311
Secure Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR. F., supra note 206, at 3.
312
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (“The program put in place by Congress does not allow
state or local officers to adopt this enforcement mechanism.”).
313
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
308
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provisions are clear that the communication with the federal government must be for
a “purpose authorized by law,”314 and the remainder of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) makes
it clear that sub-federal agents shall not investigate immigration statutes without
federal authorization and training.315 Yet the Supreme Court sanctioned such unauthorized investigations and arrests in concluding that police can be required to
communicate with ICE in every situation where “reasonable suspicion” arises concerning immigration status.316
As a practical matter, a critical point that the Supreme Court misses here is that
the “reasonable suspicion” requirement will be triggered when a noncitizen fails to
satisfy an officer’s investigative questioning about his or her status.317 (It would be
all but impossible to ascertain anything about a person’s immigration status merely
by looking at the person unless the person’s status is already known to the officer.)
The Court cites to Muehler v. Mena to conclude that, so long as the questions about
status do not prolong an otherwise lawful stop, the questions themselves do not constitute a distinct, unlawful seizure.318 But Mena involved questioning by trained federal INS agents, not questioning by sub-federal law enforcement agents untrained in
federal immigration law.319 Indeed, because the police officers who were executing the
warrant in Mena thought there might be immigration violators at the site, they brought
a trained INS agent with them to make the relevant inquiries about immigration status; they did not perform these inquiries themselves.320 The federal agent in Mena
plainly thought that INS agents were needed to investigate immigration violations.
The Court’s elision of the distinction between local police and federal immigration agents begs a question: does the immigration enforcement “expertise” that the
Court relies upon in justifying racial profiling in federal immigration enforcement
actually have substantive content?321 If the answer is no, then there is no reason not
314

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 642(c), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-707 (1996) (codified at U.S.C. § 1373 (2006)).
315
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
316
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.
317
See id. at 2508–09.
318
Id. at 2509 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005)).
319
Mena, 544 U.S. at 96.
320
Id.
321
See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (“The Government
also points out that trained officers can recognize the characteristic appearance of persons
who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut. In all situations
the officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience in detecting illegal entry and
smuggling.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 938
n.10 (9th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the dissenting view that deference was owed to the “skilled
judgment of immigration officials,” but finding that even according such deference in that case
failed to support a finding of reasonable suspicion to justify the stop in question). Indeed, one
of the Court’s most recent and important formulations of the reasonable suspicion standard
makes clear that an officer’s “experience and specialized training” is an important part of the
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to allow all law enforcement to participate in (and profile in) immigration enforcement. But the Court’s reasoning in cases involving immigration enforcement relies
on the answer to that question being “yes.”322 And since this is the case, it is not at
all clear that in deciding whether states and localities are acting in ways that are in
tension with federal law, the Court ought suddenly and for the first time to ignore
the distinction between trained agents acting within their sphere of expertise and
sub-federal law enforcement making “reasonable suspicion” determinations based
upon no particular training whatsoever.
Rather than simply assuming the constitutionality of sub-federal questioning
concerning immigration status, the Court could have just as easily highlighted the
distinction between the agents formulating and acting upon this suspicion. Had they
done so, they would have noted that Congress requires special agreements and training for sub-federal agents seeking to investigate immigration status and enforce immigration laws323 and concluded that any scheme that allows for immigration policing
in the absence of such training runs afoul of the express requirements of Congress’s
immigration enforcement scheme and is therefore preempted.324 The Court, citing
Mena, notes that immigration questioning does not alter the character of a stop for
Fourth Amendment purposes. But that Fourth Amendment truism actually does not
answer the question at issue in the Arizona case, which is whether sub-federal agents
are entitled by law to perform these immigration status investigations in the first
place. One could conclude that there is absolutely no way for the “reasonable suspicion” provision to be implemented consistently with the other requirements of
INA Section 287(g) and that the provision is therefore preempted.325
Unfortunately, in approving Section 2(B), the Court continued a new tradition
that de-emphasizes the antidiscrimination goals and rationales of federal immigration policy.326 The Court revealed the same tendency in Whiting. There, the Court
noted that Arizona’s LAWA imposed a heavy sanction on businesses for failure to
“reasonable suspicion” inquiry. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002). This
makes it all the more striking that the Court in Arizona completely failed to note the lack of
training in federal immigration law that is the hallmark of virtually every state and local officer now charged with determining whether there is “reasonable suspicion” concerning an
individual’s immigration status.
322
See discussion supra notes 32, 263–65 and accompanying text (discussing the Department of Justice Guidelines on racial profiling); see also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87
(permitting the consideration of race—although not the use of race alone—by INS Border
Patrol agents in stopping a vehicle upon “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful status).
323
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (requiring training for state and local officials to exercise
stop and arrest authority under the INA).
324
Id.
325
This would have been more consistent with the approach that the Court actually took
in analyzing S.B. 1070’s Section 6. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012)
(rejecting arrest authority for state and local officials based on immigration offenses).
326
See Johnson, supra note 263, at 1011–12.
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comply with IRCA’s prohibition on hiring unauthorized workers, but had no comparable provisions requiring businesses’ compliance with IRCA’s accompanying
antidiscrimination provisions.327 It would be easy to conclude that such a structure
encouraged discrimination in hiring and was therefore obstacle preempted by IRCA,
which sought to balance immigration enforcement with discrimination protections.328
But the Court rejected this conclusion.329
The Court’s decision in Arizona, concerning Section 2(B), also assumes without
any justification that sub-federal agents have legal authority to investigate immigration status.330 Prior to this case, the Court had never before actually held that state
and local officers were empowered to enforce either criminal or civil immigration
laws.331 Writing on a blank slate, the Court could have disapproved sub-federal enforcement of civil immigration laws.
At least one lower court to consider the question had drawn a distinction between sub-federal enforcement of the criminal provisions of the INA, which the court
approved, and enforcement of civil immigration law, which it did not.332 Although
327

Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1990 (2011) (“But the Arizona
statute subjects [an Arizona employer who intentionally hires an unauthorized alien for the
second time] to mandatory, permanent loss of the right to do business in Arizona . . . . At the
same time, the state law leaves the other side of the punishment balance—the antidiscrimination side—unchanged.”).
328
Indeed, the Third Circuit reached that conclusion about a similar provision in a local
ordinance in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 217–18 (3d
Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
329
See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984.
330
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–08.
331
See Ryan Terrence Chin, Comment, Moving Toward Subfederal Involvement in Federal
Immigration Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1865–80 (2011) (“The ambiguity over the extent
to which states and localities can engage in immigration regulation leads to inconsistencies
in immigration law.”).
332
Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475–76 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds,
Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that “federal
law does not preclude local enforcement of the criminal provisions” of federal immigration
law); see also Chin & Miller, supra note 53, at 257 (“The idea that states can independently
enforce federal and state criminal immigration provisions that deal directly with immigration
is inconsistent with immigration jurisprudence, law, and policy.”). But see Estrada v. Rhode
Island, 594 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2010) (upholding the lawfulness of a detention because the
officer had an objectively reasonable belief that the arrestees “had committed immigration
violations”); United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating
that “state law-enforcement officers have the general authority to investigate and make arrests
for violations of federal immigration laws”). Hiroshi Motomura raises a concern that, as a
practical matter, the civil/criminal divide is difficult to maintain, and that once a state or
locality is empowered to enforce any aspect of immigration law, the result is a fundamental
shift in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement from federal to
state and local agents. See generally Motomura, supra note 261.
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it is certainly the practice of many sub-federal agents to make arrests based on
immigration crimes or even civil immigration status,333 that fact did not require the
Court to find the practice constitutional. The Court could just as easily have concluded that authorizing such practices would result in the harassment of noncitizens
in contravention of established law, and was therefore preempted.334 This would have
had implications for law enforcement practices well beyond Arizona and S.B. 1070,
but that would not preclude the Court from reaching that conclusion, and was arguably a reason for them to do so.
Interestingly, even if the Court had struck down this portion of Section 2(B),
Arizona still would have been able to rely on its own smuggling laws to achieve immigration enforcement through state criminal laws. Because Arizona routinely prosecutes unauthorized migrants under state law for the dubious offense of “smuggling”
themselves, Arizona officials have an independent state law ground for making arrests on the basis of immigration status alone.335 This provision was not enjoined in
early S.B. 1070 litigation,336 but recent successful challenges to these practices may
undercut this method of local enforcement.337 The Melendres litigation, which has unearthed evidence of discrimination against Latinos by the Maricopa County Sheriff’s
Office, highlights just what could be at stake in the implementation of Section 2(B).
Opponents of S.B. 1070 are now directly challenging the alien smuggling provisions
of Arizona law—as amended by S.B. 1070—as preempted.338 Similar provisions in
other jurisdictions are vulnerable to such challenges as well,339 and they may be
constitutionally prohibited.
There is a separate provision in Section 2(B) not yet considered here: one that
requires that an individual who is arrested not be released until their immigration
status is ascertained.340 The Arizona Court made clear that they were presuming
that checks would be made within the course of an authorized, lawful arrest, and
333

See Eagly, supra note 131, at 1773.
See Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination, Preemption, and Arizona’s Immigration Law:
A Broader View, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org
/online/discrimination-preemption (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)). See
also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418–20 (1948) (invalidating a
California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to those “ineligible for
citizenship” and holding that state laws cannot impose discriminatory burdens on aliens
lawfully in the United States).
335
See Eagly, supra note 131, at 1773.
336
See id. at 1754 for a description of some of the difficulties facing would-be challengers.
337
See the discussion of Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (D. Ariz. 2012),
and Melendres v. Arpaio, 659 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012), supra notes 128–134.
338
See Valle del Sol Motion, supra note 10, at 41–42.
339
For a noncomprehensive list of similar provisions, see Eagly, supra note 131, at 1817
n.411.
340
Ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41).
334
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concluded unanimously that so long as this was the case, there was nothing to preempt the requirement of an immigration status check in this context.341 The Court
made it clear that the provision survived preemption, but only if read narrowly.342
This could be read as a legal victory for opponents of the law, but here again, a
different path was possible.
With the Secure Communities program, the federal government already attempts
to make determinations of immigration status based on state and local arrests.343
This is true not just in Arizona, but in all 3,074 jurisdictions in which the program
has been implemented.344 Localities that do not want the federal government to perform immigration status checks of their arrestees have tried, unsuccessfully, to opt
out of the program.345 Given existing programs and statutory provisions on cooperation, one could conclude (as the unanimous Court did) that it was not much of a
stretch for the Court to allow the provision of Section 2(B) of the Arizona law,
which required status checks for every arrestee,346 to stand.
On the other hand, one could just as easily conclude that the Arizona arrest
policy is completely inconsistent with the stated goals and the federal design of the
Secure Communities program. In explaining the goals of the Secure Communities
program, the federal government has been clear that its goal is to eliminate state and
local inquiries into status. Federal policy evinces concern that leaving such inquiries in
sub-federal hands increases the risk of impermissible discrimination. As a matter of
fact, this antidiscrimination rationale is cited as a central justification of the Secure
Communities program.347 The federal government argues that it is seeking to implement a uniform system whereby all arrestees have information processed by federal
agents through a federal database without state law enforcement inquiries into status, rather than by state officials investigating status and making direct inquiries to
federal agents about status.348 The latter approach allows for inconsistencies and discrimination in the implementation of federal immigration law that is arguably out
341

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509, 2515, 2522 (2012) (citing each of the
three opinions).
342
See id. at 2509.
343
Secure Communities, supra note 242.
344
SECURE CMTYS, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf
/sc-activated.pdf (“As of August 22, 2012, the biometric information sharing capability
is activated in 3,074 jurisdictions in 50 states, 4 territories and Washington D.C. During
FY2013, ICE plans to use this capability nationwide. The enforcement statistics are current
as of July 31, 2012.”).
345
See supra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing the (failed) efforts of various
jurisdictions to opt out of the program).
346
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., § 2(B) (Ariz. 2010).
347
Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 242 (“Secure
Communities reduces opportunities for racial or ethnic profiling . . . .”).
348
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 245.
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of step with federal law and policy.349 And because it permits impermissible forms
of alienage and racial discrimination that are in contravention of federal law and
policy, it also could have been deemed preempted.350 It is only by de-emphasizing
antidiscrimination norms that the Court is able to avoid a finding of obstacle preemption with respect to Section 2(B).351
Of course, critics contend that Secure Communities does not have the effect of
decreasing discrimination, and in fact, results in an increase in discriminatory
policing.352 I share these concerns. The point here is simply that the federal government’s explicitly stated goal in rolling out the program is to eliminate sub-federal
discretion (and discrimination) in immigration policing.353 In theory, Secure Communities allows federal agents to sort out the immigration status of local arrestees
and decide what enforcement policy to pursue without involving sub-federal agents
at all. The design of the program plainly reveals the federal determination to use
state and local law enforcement efforts to complement immigration enforcement.
It signals the executive’s desire to return to the pre-2001 immigration federalism
status quo—dominant throughout the last century—in which state and local police
were formally uninvolved in the discretionary functions of immigration policing.
That goal is consistent with—indeed mandated by—existing immigration laws
enacted by Congress. The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States
flatly undercuts that goal.
CONCLUSION
The courthouse doors are not closed to the opponents of S.B. 1070. The Court
has made it clear that it is willing to entertain claims that arise if the Arizona law
is implemented in ways that conflict with federal law or result in violation of
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures or the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.354 And the Court also made it clear that
it will continue to guard federal primacy as a formal legal matter in immigration
law and policy.355 But in deciding the Arizona case as it did, the Court missed an
349

See discussion supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra note 334 and accompanying text.
351
See discussion supra notes 326–29 and accompanying text.
352
See, e.g., AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY,
SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS 2 (2011) (finding, among other things, that in
Secure Communities jurisdictions, “people are being apprehended who should never have
been placed in immigration custody, and that certain groups are overrepresented” among
arrestees in Secure Communities jurisdictions).
353
See supra note 347 and accompanying text (noting ICE justification of the Secure
Communities program).
354
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opportunity to end a host of ongoing immigration enforcement practices that undercut
federal authority in immigration policy. The Court has also raised the bar for future
Fourth Amendment challenges by implicitly expanding Fourth Amendment cases
on immigration policing to bestow on sub-federal agents the same authority granted
to trained federal agents.356 The most notable feature of the decision, however, is not
the Court’s implicit acceptance of the constitutionality of ongoing (and arguably
unconstitutional) practices, but the Court’s ongoing willingness to disregard the
antidiscrimination goals of federal immigration policy even as the Court purports
to reify federal primacy in immigration law.

356

See discussion supra notes 310–39.

